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Enactments allowing rules to supersede statutes have been upheld, gener-
ally upon the ground that such rule-making power is inherent in the courts.
Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (93I) In re Constitutionality
Of Section 251-i8, Wisconsin Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W 717
(193 1), State v Superior Court, supra.
The position of the court in Busher v. Macek, supra, seems to be entirely
unjustified on either authority or reason. Cleveland Railway Co. v. Halliday,
supra, cannot be considered as authority because that case was one involving
substantive rights as distinguished from mere procedure. Nor is the case of
Van ingen v. Berger, supra, authority for the extreme position taken. As has
been seen, the Van Ingen Case involved a direct conflict between the provisions
of a statute and those of a rule of court. The Busher Case goes a step further
by holding invalid a rule of court when in conflict with a legislative intent
inferred from the silence or absence of a statute.
The view taken in the Busher Case, if carried to its logical extreme,
would invalidate the bulk of the rules of court in this state. There are few
subjects not in some way regulated by statute. Under the doctrine of the
Busher Case, it would only be necessary to show that the subject is in some
way regulated by statute. Then, if a rule of court regulates the same subject,
even in an entirely different aspect, the rule would be void because the silence
of the statute on the aspect of the subject regulated by rule must be inferred
to mean a legislative antent that it should not be regulated. The logical im-
plications of such a view should make the supreme court reconsider its position
and support that of State, ex rel. Shube, v. Beck, supra. Until that is done,
procedural reform by rule of court is impossible in Ohio, unless the legislature
authorizes rules of court to supersede procedural statutes.
ABRAHAM GERTNER.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF FINDING OF DATE OF
DEATH OF PRESUMED DECEDENT
Fanny Ernst, mother of George A. Webber, died on September 5, 1930.
Morrissey as administrator of the estate of Webber, a presumed decedent,
made demand of McCorry for the funds held by him as administrator of the
estate of Fanny Ernst. The claim of Morrissey was based on the finding of
the probate court of Hamilton County that the death of George A. Webber
was presumed to have occurred subsequent to the death of his mother.
Smith, guardian of Medina Webber, joined with Walter Webber in this
petition. They alleged that George A. Webber, father of Walter and Medina,
had been absent and unheard from for a period of over eight years antecedent
to the death of his mother; that the presumption of his death arose before the
date of his mother's death, and that Walter and Medina were therefore her
sole heirs and entitled to the proceeds of her estate.
It was held by the Court of Appeals, Fourth District, that the pleading
of the petitioners was suflicient to create a legal presumption that George A.
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Webber pre-deceased his mother. The court stated that the presumed de-
cedent statute purports to bestow on the probate court authority to determine
the date when the presumption of death from absence arises, but that such a
finding does not conclude strangers to the degree; and that that therefore
George A. Webber by the common law is presumed to have died seven years
after he was last heard from and in the absence of evidence rebutting such
presumption the petitioners are established as the legal heirs of Fanny Ernst.
Morriusey, Admr v. Smith, Gdn. et al., 17 abs. 240. (Decided, November
15, 1933-)
It has long been a rule of almost universal application that for all legal
purposes a presumption of death arises from a continued unexplained absence
from the domicile of the absentee for seven years, when the absentee has not
been heard from for that period. University v. Harrison, 90 N. C. 387,
(1887), Samberg v. Knights of Modern Maccabees, 158 Mich. 568, 123
N. W z5, (19o9), Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Ohio St. 232, (I88o), Nichols v.
Clare, 32 0. C. A. 555, affirmed without opinion, 75 Ohio St. 6oo, (i9o6),
Oglesby v. Rose, 21 Oh. Dec. 29I, I1 N. P (N. S.) 188, (191o).
The common law rule as to the presumption of death is incorporated in
the Ohio Statutes in Section io636-I, where it is provided, that "A person
shall be presumed to be dead after seven years continued absence, unheard of
from his or her last domicile, and any person entitled to share in his or her
estate may present a petition in the probate court in the county of his or her
last domicile setting forth the facts which raise the presumpion of death."
The decree of the probate court of Hamilton County which fixed the
date at which the presumption of death arose, is expressly authorized by the
terms of Section io636-4. "The probate court having become satisfied that
the legal presumption of death is made out, the court shall so decree, and the
court may determine in such decree the date when such presumption arose."
Freeman on Judgments Vol. 3, Section 1520 states that the proceeding
in a probate court for the appointment of administrator is a proceeding in rem,
or as sometimes stated "in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and without
notice, in courts admitting wills to probate and granting administration, and
the expectancies of heirs and distributees swept away, when the weakness of
infancy, or residence in a foreign land, should, seemingly, protect them, be-
cause of the permanent political consideration that the rights of property thus
situated should be speedily settled by a legal ascertainment of them." The
decrees of the probate courts establish a status necessarily binding on all the
world in cases where administrators are appointed. In re Baker's Estate, 170
Cal. 578, 150 P 989, (1915), Tatem v. Wright, 139 Md. 20, 114 A. 836,
(i92), Thompson v. Freeman, I i Fla. 433, 149 So. 740, (i933), Cross
v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 623, io N. E. 16o, (1887), Bucyrus Steel Cast-
ings Co. v. Farkas, 15 N. P (N. S.) 609, 27 Oh. Dec. 220, (914), Ewalt
v. Ames, 6 App. 370, 27 0. C. A. 465, 29 0. C. D. 133, (1917).
Is tie decree of the probate court of Hamilton County a decree in rem
only as to the jurisdictional fact of death or the presumption thereof, or does
it extend to and include the finding and decree that the presumption arose as
of a specified date?
Many early cases are on record in which the courts have rendered de-
cisions on this precise question. Freeman on Judgments, Vol. 3, Section 1520
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states the principle behind these early cases: "Where a proceeding has been
had in the nature of a proceeding in rem, whenever the judgment is drawn
in question in another action affecting the same property or subject-matter,
the facts found by the first tribunal which were necessary to the formation of
the sentence pronounced are conclusive of the existence of such facts and can
never be the subject of inquiry upon a subsequent investigation in another
tribunal more than the sentence itself. Pinso= v. Ivey, 9 Tenn. 349 (1830),
United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch. 73, (18o6), Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins.
Co., 4 Cranch. 195, (x8o8), Gelstern v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat, z46, (i8i8),
Jewett v. Jewett, 6 Mass. 277, (18 1O).
The more recent cases disclose that the courts still adhere to this doctrine.
In In re Bloom's Estate, (Cal.) 293 P 633, (1931), the court held that "a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one instituted for the purpose of estab-
lishing the status of a written instrument; while the order admitting the same
to probate is conclusive in subsequent proceedings as to the ultimate fact of
the will, it is not save as to the parties litigant, or for the purpose of the pro-
ceeding itself, conclusive as to the facts upon which the question of will or no
will depends." Sorenson v Sorenson, 68 Neb. 483, 103 N. W 455, (903),
Clapp v. Vatcher, 9 Cal. App. 46z, 99 P 549, (i9o8), Gasquet v. Fenner,
247 U. S. 16, 38 S. Ct. 46, 6z L. Ed. 956, (1918).
Two comparatively recent New York decisions involved facts very similar
to those presented in the principal case. The court in In re Rowe, 197 App.
Div 449, 189 N. Y S. 395, (1921), stated, "A decrees of the Surrogate
Court in proceedings to have an administrator of the estate of an absentee
appointed is in no event an adjudication with respect to the time of the
death of the absentee and binding on the surrogate of another county in a
proceeding in which the exact date is material, since the date was not neces-
sary to be established with exactness, and all the surrogate had to determine
was that the absentee was presumed to be dead prior to the issuance of letters
and accordingly fixed the date as the date of the decree authorizing the letters
to issue." Affirmed without opinion, 232 N. Y 554, 134 N. E. 569. To
the same effect is Bering v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 2oI App.
Div. 35, 193 N. Y S. 753, (1922).
While the court in the principal case cites no authority for its statement
as to the conclusiveness of a finding as to the date of death, the decision is in
accord with the doctrine established elsewhere by a long line of cases.
JAMES R. TRITSCHLER.
AUGMENTATION OF ASSETS BY MEANS
OF CASH ITEMS
The Union Trust Co. was named trustee and distributing agent in con-
nection with a bond issue put out by the plaintiff, the University of Dayton.
It was provided in the trust instrument that the plaintiff was to make periodical
payments into a fund out of which the trustee was to discharge the interest
and the principal on the bonds. The first payment was made by a check
drawn by plaintiff on its account in the commercial department of the trustee
